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The True Man & the Battered Woman: 
Prospects for Gender-Neutral Narratives in 
Self-Defense Doctrines 
 
Katelyn E. Keegan* 
The recent rise of controversial Stand Your Ground laws has sparked discussions on 
self-defense law. Comparing the new Stand Your Ground laws with another self-
defense doctrine—Battered Women’s Syndrome—it becomes apparent that the law 
solidifies gender stereotypes by assessing when an individual is justified in using deadly 
force against an aggressor. “True men” are empowered to use deadly force in public 
without a duty to retreat, while a battered woman often must provide expert testimony 
on her psychological condition to prove the reasonableness of her use of deadly force 
in light of her severe helplessness. At their extremes, both of these doctrines are 
detrimental to the criminal law and potentially encourage dangerous policy and 
undesirable public conduct.  
 
This Note argues that legal reforms should moderate these extremes and create a more 
gender-neutral process for proving self-defense claims no matter the theory. While the 
psychology of juror decisionmaking and the public’s familiarity with the classic 
narratives likely limit prospects for reform, change is necessary to modernize and 
equalize self-defense law. Ideally, a new legal framework of individualization for 
proving self-defense claims can find the middle ground between the empowerment 
doctrine of true men and the helplessness ideology behind Battered Women’s 
Syndrome, and will allow the jury to listen to each defendant’s narrative regardless of 
whether it falls under the traditional paradigm.  
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The True Man Doctrine and Battered Women’s Syndrome are two 
theories of self-defense that expose gendered distinctions in criminal law 
by differentiating between the courageous man protecting his family and 
home, and the subordinate, helpless woman left with no option but to 
kill. Such distinctions ignore the similarities of these two situations and 
the mutual zone of reasonable conduct under a threat of violence from 
an aggressor, whether a stranger or a familiar abuser. This Note argues 
that there should be a gender-neutral and individualized assessment of 
justification narratives available to reasonable people—both men and 
women—under dire circumstances that require the use of self-defense. 
Affirmative defenses in the criminal law aim to limit or eliminate 
culpability. Defenses are divided into two categories: justifications and 
excuses. When a defense is treated as an excuse rather than a justification, 
the jury views the defendant’s act as wrong and only tolerable because of 
her mental or emotional state.1 Conversely, justified conduct is encouraged 
under the law, and the jury approves of the defendant’s act due to 
surrounding circumstances.2 
 
 1. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623, 631 (1980). 
 2. Id. 
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In homicide cases, defendants often turn to the well-recognized self-
defense justification. Self-defense generally requires imminence and 
necessity, and the defendant carries the burden to establish both 
elements.3 As Joshua Dressler describes, “deadly force is only justified in 
self-protection if the actor reasonably believes that its use is necessary to 
prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor.”4 It 
is unsurprising that these two elements require a high standard of proof, 
as the result of a successful self-defense claim is an acquittal. 
English common law provided a foundation for self-defense in the 
United States.5 England required that an individual claiming self-defense 
could only do so when the individual used deadly force as a last resort 
after being physically backed against a wall with no opportunity to 
escape.6 American common law adopted this English tradition in early 
self-defense doctrine.7 Over time, the historical requirement of a duty to 
retreat eroded in favor of allowing an individual to “stand his ground” in 
order to protect his family and property.8 Criminal law refers to this 
policy as the “True Man” doctrine, which recognizes the traditional role 
of men and the expectation that they are the sole guardians of the family 
and home.9 
Historically, the state condoned the use of deadly force not only in 
and around the home, but also in public places so long as the defender 
lawfully had a right to be there.10 This policy justified deadly force even 
when retreat was a viable option.11 An individual needed only to show he 
had a lawful right to be somewhere, and the state condoned the person’s 
use of deadly force to protect himself.12 The rise of “Stand Your Ground” 
laws is the newest example of the use of True Man ideology as a valid 
justification for deadly force.13 
 
 3. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4 (2d ed. 2003) (“One who is not 
the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force against his adversary 
when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his 
adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.”). 
 4. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 18.01[B], at 223 (5th ed. 2009) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 5. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 Harv. J.L. & Gender 
237, 240–43 (2008).  
 6. Benjamin Levin, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 523, 528 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 531. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Suk, supra note 5, at 244–45.  
 10. Id. at 246.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 261.  
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The long history of the True Man doctrine contrasts starkly with the 
development of another theory of self-defense: Battered Women’s 
Syndrome (“BWS” or the “Syndrome”). Unlike the extensive presence of 
the True Man ideology in America, BWS is a fairly recent legal construct 
that came into existence in 1979 to provide domestic violence victims the 
ability to claim self-defense despite different experiences of imminence 
and necessity than under traditional self-defense law.14 Currently, the 
majority of jurisdictions allow evidence of BWS to support a claim of self-
defense.15 However, courts generally “understand the syndrome in more 
diagnostic terms . . . as a subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder.”16 
This psychological classification has created problems for defendants 
whose experiences do not fit within this kind of medical condition.17 
When comparing these two theories of self-defense, it is apparent 
that these doctrines fall along gendered lines. This Note argues that both 
narratives are dangerous at their extremes. Because these doctrines are 
so dependent on stereotypical gender roles, they preclude individuals 
from using either justification effectively if their experience falls outside 
of the accepted narrative. Women should be justified in using force 
against an abusive partner just as much as a man should feel empowered 
to protect himself, his family, and his home in the face of an attacker. 
Justification narratives should include a middle ground between 
helplessness and empowerment that could be used by reasonable people 
claiming self-defense. The creation of a gender-neutral framework based 
on reasonableness could counteract the threat of conventional 
stereotypes on criminal justice. 
Unfortunately, legal reform may be insufficient to solve the 
problem. Social psychology demonstrates that juror decisionmaking 
depends so heavily on the commonly accepted narrative that jurors may 
cling to the historic interpretations of legal doctrines despite reforms.18 
Psychologists developed BWS to combat the restraints of the True Man 
narrative,19 but in doing so they created an entirely different storytelling 
framework. The initial effort to create a separate doctrine for domestic 
violence victims has created problems for defendants seeking to draw 
parallels between their use of force and the traditional aggressor’s. In 
practice, BWS creates more barriers between the narratives of abused 
women and “true men” than bridges. Any hope for successful changes to 
 
 14. See generally David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and the Science 
of Expert Testimony, 2 Mod. Sci. Evidence § 13:1 (2012). 
 15. 23 Corpus Juris Secundum: Criminal Law § 1449, at 124 (2012). 
 16. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:3. 
 17. Id. § 13:4 
 18. See Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 261, 264 (2008). 
 19. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:1. 
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the legal doctrine must take into account jurors’ use of narratives and the 
potential prejudices that coincide with traditional decisionmaking 
psychology. 
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of the True Man 
doctrine and the recent emergence of Stand Your Ground laws. Part II 
summarizes the evolution of BWS and its common interpretation as a 
psychological defect. Part II also details the evidentiary burdens that a 
defendant claiming BWS must overcome, including the importance of 
expert psychological testimony. Part III describes the social psychology 
behind juror decisionmaking and the interpretation of the “reasonable 
person” in the criminal law. Part IV proposes a gender-neutral 
framework for evaluating claims without the detrimental effects of 
stereotypes and the likelihood of success given the subconscious thought 
process behind juror decisionmaking. 
I.  The Empowered Man: The True Man Doctrine and the 
Emergence of Stand Your Ground Laws 
A. History of the True Man Doctrine 
[T]he defense of one’s self is a requirement of the masculine mystique. 
—Frederick Baum20 
English common law enforced a duty to retreat in self-defense 
claims, and any person who used deadly force in self-defense “must have 
first retreated until his back was to the wall.”21 The so-called retreat 
requirement supported an individual’s claims of necessity and imminence 
because a person could not physically escape a dangerous situation 
without the use of force. Despite the strict duty to retreat, the English 
still adopted an exception to the duty in the case of an attack inside one’s 
own home.22 Early self-defense doctrine “embod[ied] the common law 
idea that in his home, a man may forcefully defend himself, his family, 
and his property against harm by others.”23 This common law rule of the 
so-called “castle doctrine” carried over into early American law, and 
allowed an individual to use deadly force against an aggressor inside of 
his home to prevent harm to persons or property.24 
In the late nineteenth-century, American law expanded the doctrine 
of self-defense and recognized the right to stand one’s ground to kill in 
self-defense, both in his home and anywhere he lawfully had a right to 
 
 20. Frederic S. Baum & Joan Baum, Law of Self-Defense 1 (1970). 
 21. Levin, supra note 6, at 528. 
 22. Id. at 530. 
 23. Suk, supra note 5, at 239. 
 24. Levin, supra note 6, at 531. 
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be.25 Over time, this became known as the “True Man” doctrine and held 
that an individual is not required to retreat, even if he can do so safely, 
when he has a reasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or 
great bodily harm and is in a place where he has a right to be.26 The 
majority of jurisdictions eliminated the traditional duty to retreat, and in 
doing so created “the paradigmatic case for understanding how the ‘true 
man’ ought to be expected to behave.”27 
The policy surrounding the rule initially aimed to protect a person 
from having to flee a dangerous situation in a cowardly way.28 In 1877, 
the Indiana Supreme Court noted that “the tendency of the American 
mind seems to be very strongly against the enforcement of any rule 
which requires a person to flee when assailed, to avoid chastisement.”29 
In other words, American culture supported the rule that retreat should 
not be required if it would lead to embarrassment. The ideology behind 
the true man “enabled judges to leverage this appealing idea of a man 
defending his home and family into a more general authorization of self-
defense in public places, even where the home and family were nowhere 
to be seen.”30 Throughout the twentieth century, courts upheld an 
individual’s use of deadly force against an assailant without retreat 
wherever the individual had a right to be, and this right was protected both 
in public places and locations where the individual had a proprietary 
interest.31 In modern American law, a majority of jurisdictions do not 
require an individual to retreat before using self-defense.32 
B. Current State of the True Man Doctrine 
The True Man doctrine experienced a revival in the twenty-first 
century, largely thanks to the lobbying efforts of the National Rifle 
Association.33 Beginning with Florida in 2005, state legislatures adopted 
renewed forms of Stand Your Ground laws that allow citizens to use 
 
 25. See Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 561–62 (1895) (quoting Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 
83 (1877)). 
 26. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7 (1986); 
40 Corpus Juris Secundum: Homicide § 206, at 29 (2012). 
 27. Levin, supra note 6, at 531. 
 28. See, e.g., Suk, supra note 5, at 241–44. 
 29. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877). 
 30. Suk, supra note 5, at 245. 
 31. Id. at 246 (“[T]he right accompanied the individual wherever he went. The rule of no duty to 
retreat was based on a right to be in any legitimate place. It was the intrusion on that right that 
relieved the person of the duty to retreat.”). 
 32. LaFave & Scott, supra note 26, § 5.7(f). 
 33. Suk, supra note 5, at 260. 
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deadly force against aggressors in public places.34 Specifically, the Florida 
Stand Your Ground statute provides: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is 
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no 
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet 
force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes 
it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible 
felony.35 
Florida’s prototypical self-defense law codifies and broadens the 
traditional True Man doctrine in three ways: “[I]t expands the 
circumstances in which the use of deadly force is permitted in the home; 
it abrogates the duty to retreat in public places; and it creates criminal 
and civil immunity for people who act in self-defense.”36 
The 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin, an African-American teenager, 
brought Stand Your Ground laws under national scrutiny and 
highlighted the potential for racial profiling and bias to influence an 
individual’s perception of imminent harm.37 Martin’s killer, George 
Zimmerman, admitted to shooting the unarmed teen in self-defense, and 
a Florida jury acquitted him in July 2013.38 The return of these statutes is 
unsurprisingly controversial, as it inserts the ideology of the Wild West 
into modern neighborhoods, and it permits a person to use deadly force 
outside of the home, even in situations where retreat is both possible and 
potentially more reasonable than facing a perceived aggressor. 
For the minority of states that continue to impose a retreat 
requirement, nearly all of them have adopted an exception for the 
home.39 However, even in the jurisdictions that exclude attacks within the 
home from the retreat requirement on the basis of the castle doctrine, 
they disagree as to whether this exception applies when someone is 
attacked by a cohabitant inside the home rather than an unlawful 
intruder.40 In 1914, Judge Cardozo wrote: 
 
 34. Fla. Stat. § 776.013(3) (2008). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Suk, supra note 5, at 261. 
 37. Although this Note does not focus on the racial aspects of Stand Your Ground laws, or of self-
defense law generally, this is an important issue in the debate over the justified use of deadly force. See 
generally Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 
210 (2012); Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon 
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. 
Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 271 (2012); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias 
in a not yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 101 (2013). 
 38. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. 
Times, June 14, 2013, at A1. 
 39. LaFave & Scott, supra note 26, § 5.7(f). 
 40. Id. 
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It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own 
dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, 
and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the 
highways, a fugitive from his own home. . . . The rule is the same 
whether the attack proceeds from some other occupant or from an 
intruder.41 
Judge Cardozo’s opinion on the use of force against a cohabitant 
reflected the relationship between a man and his home, and reiterated 
the rights of the true man.42 It is unclear how Judge Cardozo’s reasoning 
should extend to cases of domestic violence, but his logic certainly 
supports eliminating a duty to retreat inside the home in such cases. Such 
an interpretation would give an abused woman the crucial legal authority 
to defend herself inside her home against a known attacker. 
Courts have recognized the negative policy implications of imposing 
a duty to retreat inside the home during attacks from co-occupants.43 
Jeanne Suk raises an interesting comparison on the inability to use force 
against an abusive cohabitant and the implications for women attempting 
to use a Stand Your Ground theory of self-defense: 
If the American “true man” rule was based on the idea of a man being 
in a place where he has a right to be, the home was of course the 
quintessential place where a man had a right to be. If a person does not 
have a right to be at home, there is perhaps no place where he has a 
right to be.44 
If the law authorizes individuals to use deadly force without a duty 
to retreat both in public and inside the home pursuant to the True Man 
doctrine, women should be able to use similar self-defense claims under 
BWS. Both of these doctrines involve situations in which an individual 
faces a threat of violence from an aggressor. For battered women, their 
experiences with their partners have taught them to expect an attack at 
certain times, such as when their partner is drunk or when he gets home 
from work.45 Requiring women to retreat in these circumstances is not 
always feasible because many abused women have nowhere else to go, or 
alternatively, fear a retaliatory attack if they are able to escape 
temporarily.46 
Conversely, individuals facing an unknown attacker are not always 
physically bound to the location of the attack. In public places, a person 
 
 41. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497–98 (N.Y. 1914). 
 42. Suk, supra note 5, at 249. 
 43. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (“[I]mposing a duty to retreat from the 
residence has a potentially damaging effect on victims of domestic violence claiming self-defense.”); 
see also State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570–71 (N.J. 1997); State v. White, 819 N.W. 2d 473, 477 (Neb. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 44. Suk, supra note 5, at 247. 
 45. See, e.g., Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:2. 
 46. See, e.g., Suk, supra note 5, at 253. 
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standing his ground also has the opportunity to retreat to his home or 
otherwise avoid a more violent confrontation. While the attack in this 
case may appear more imminent, the necessity of force to protect oneself 
is likely less than what is required of abused women to fight off their 
abuser on a regular basis. Thus, the duty to retreat should similarly be 
excluded in the domestic violence context. Unfortunately, courts and 
juries often view the duty to retreat from an abusive partner differently 
than the duty to retreat when the aggressor is an intruder or even a co-
owner of property. 
II.  The Helpless Woman: Battered Women’s Syndrome and 
Related Evidentiary Burdens 
The story of one New Jersey couple provides a helpful introduction 
to the legal struggles faced by battered women. Throughout Gladys and 
Ernest Kelly’s seven-year marriage, Ernest beat Gladys as often as once 
a week.47 The attacks generally occurred after Ernest drank, and he 
frequently “threatened to kill Ms. Kelly and to cut off parts of her body if 
she tried to leave him.”48 One afternoon, a drunken Ernest knocked 
Gladys down in public, choked her, punched her, and bit her leg.49 When 
Gladys eventually got up to look for her daughter, Ernest ran toward her 
with his hands raised and appeared right next to her within seconds.50 
Gladys did not know whether her husband had armed himself while she 
searched for her daughter, so she grabbed a pair of scissors from her 
pocketbook.51 Although she intended to merely scare him with the 
scissors, she ultimately stabbed and killed him.52 The trial court convicted 
Gladys Kelly of reckless manslaughter and rejected her claim of self-
defense because the jury determined that her perception of danger was 
unreasonable.53 The Kelly case provides an example of how courts 
evaluated abused women’s self-defense claims prior to the acceptance of 
BWS.54 
Under traditional self-defense law, a defendant carries the burden of 
showing that he used force out of necessity to avoid an imminent attack by 
 
 47. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. 1984). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 368. 
 54. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the decision of the trial court and 
remanded the case due to the lower court’s error in excluding expert testimony on BWS, and for the 
first time, the court held that such expert testimony is admissible to help establish claims of self-
defense in homicide cases. Id. 
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an aggressor.55 In cases involving domestic violence, many women fail to 
meet this burden due to the imminence element, which requires the actor 
to reasonably believe that an attack is just about to occur. For women 
who consistently face abuse by a partner, a reasonable belief that an 
attack might occur in the near future is insufficient to establish 
imminence.56 Particularly in cases in which the woman kills while her 
abuser’s back is turned, “[s]uch killings, under traditional self-defense 
concepts, are thought to be inspired by cowardice or revenge on the part 
of one of two equal combatants. In legal parlance, this type of behavior 
does not merit the privilege of self-defense because the danger does not 
appear to be imminent.”57 Therefore, women who killed their abusers 
outside of the moment immediately preceding an attack (when their 
abusers were asleep, for example) had no defense under the criminal 
law.58 
In 1979, clinical researcher Lenore Walker originated BWS as a 
psychological doctrine, seeking to provide a stopgap between the 
traditional elements of self-defense and a logical extension of the policy 
to the context of domestic violence.59 However, women still face 
significant obstacles due to the traditional imminence requirement 
because their opportunity to fight back may not occur immediately 
before a beating. A battered woman’s perception of danger is wholly 
dependent on her experience of past abuse, which is generally considered 
irrelevant under the traditional self-defense paradigm.60 
The Syndrome consists of two related psychological concepts. The 
first is the idea of “learned helplessness,” in which an abused woman 
develops an unwillingness or inability to seek help from others, even 
when it is made available.61 Learned helplessness helps to counteract 
common views that a woman failed to leave an abusive relationship and 
therefore consented to the abuse.62 Psychologist Martin Seligman 
originally coined the expression of “learned helplessness” to describe 
laboratory dogs’ behavior after being subjected to electric shocks.63 
 
 55. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:2. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 Women’s Rts. L. 
Rep. 101, 112 (1993). 
 58. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:2. 
 59. Id. § 13:1 (“According to Walker, the syndrome . . . explains why battered women sometimes 
kill their abusers under circumstances that do not mirror traditional cases of self-defense. Specifically, 
syndrome advocates seek to explain why battered women sometimes resort to deadly force when, 
seemingly, they are not confronted by an imminent harm.”). 
 60. Kampmann, supra note 57, at 112. 
 61. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:5. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J. 
Abnormal Psychol. 256 (1968). 
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Throughout his experiments, Seligman discovered that “[a]fter initial 
attempts to escape proved futile, the dogs began to submit to the shocks 
without resistance. When the procedure was changed to present the dogs 
with an opportunity to escape, the ‘helpless’ dogs failed to respond.”64 
Walker analogized these results to battered women and found that 
over time, women similarly became “learned helpless” and lost 
motivation to respond to violent stimuli.65 According to one court, some 
women “become so demoralized and degraded by the fact that they 
cannot predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of 
psychological paralysis and become unable to take any action at all to 
improve or alter the situation.”66 Learned helplessness works in 
conjunction with the second aspect of BWS to explain the particular 
circumstances and perceptions of battered women.67 
The second psychological aspect of BWS is the Walker Cycle 
Theory, in which a woman’s sense of helplessness is reinforced by a cycle 
of violence consisting of (1) a tension-building phase; (2) an explosion of 
violence; and (3) a phase of loving contrition.68 “[A]ccording to the cycle 
theory, the woman experiences the growing tension of phase one, 
develops a fear of death or serious bodily harm during phase two, and, 
perceiving that she will be unable to defend herself when the next attack 
comes, finally ‘defends’ herself at her only opportunity.”69 The theory 
demonstrates the relationship between two critical issues in a self-
defense claim: the defendant’s reasonable belief that force is necessary, 
and the reasonableness of the amount of force used.70 A woman’s 
knowledge of her abuser’s violent history influences her perception of 
danger, and her experience throughout the cycles leaves her in a constant 
fear of an imminent attack.71 
Because many BWS cases involve women who cannot physically 
defend themselves against larger and stronger aggressors, the amount of 
force used can seem disproportionate. Traditional self-defense law 
assumes two individuals equal in “size, strength, and physical training,” 
but women are generally smaller, weaker, and lack similar physical 
training.72 The woman may believe that her abuser is physically capable 
 
 64. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:5 n.5 (citing Seligman et al., supra note 63). 
 65. Id. § 13:5. 
 66. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984). 
 67. Feminist scholars have debated the validity of the learned helplessness theory. See generally 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of 
Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 213 (1992). 
 68. See Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 95–104 (1984). 
 69. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:4. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Schneider, supra note 1, at 632. 
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of injuring or killing her without a weapon.73 “If a woman perceives 
herself to be trapped in a cycle of potentially deadly violence, she may 
reasonably feel compelled to resort to deadly force in preempting the 
aggression of the unarmed but more powerful man.”74 Accordingly, in 
many cases it is perfectly reasonable for a woman to arm herself with a 
weapon to ward off a bigger and stronger aggressor. 
Additionally, a woman cannot physically retreat any further than 
her own home. In State v. Thomas, the Ohio Supreme Court described 
that “a person in her own home has already retreated ‘to the wall,’ as 
there is no place to which she can further flee in safety.”75 This 
observation parallels the concerns about the duty to retreat in the castle 
doctrine and early self-defense law, yet it is treated differently in the 
domestic violence context. 
Generally, the law considers BWS as a psychological condition apart 
from other legal defenses. Rather than focusing on a woman’s testimony 
about her personal perception of the likelihood of an attack from her 
abuser, BWS relies on expert testimony to prove the woman’s psychiatric 
condition and to show her subjective and honest belief that force was 
necessary to protect herself from an attack.76 The requirement of expert 
psychological testimony objectively supports the woman’s argument that 
she acted reasonably under the circumstances and in light of her 
experience with her abusive partner, but does not always permit the 
individual woman’s story to be heard. 
BWS critics take issue with the objective element of the self-defense 
standard, “arguing that even if a battered woman who killed under non-
confrontational circumstances honestly believed that defensive force was 
necessary, her belief could not have been reasonable.”77 The importance 
of psychological evaluations overshadows the testimony of the woman 
herself. Indeed, in some cases, expert testimony entirely replaces the 
woman’s testimony: the expert can testify that the defendant suffers from 
BWS and the defendant can avoid waiving her Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. Although there are cases in which 
the expert would provide better testimony than the defendant, the jury 
should be allowed to consider the abused woman’s personal history of 
abuse in assessing her self-defense claim.78 There are certainly situations 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:4. 
 75. State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997). 
 76. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:11. 
 77. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s 
Self-Defense, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 155, 164 (2004) (citing Stephen J. Morse, The “New 
Syndrome Excuse Syndrome”, 14 Crim. Just. Ethics, no. 1, at 12 (1995)). 
 78. David Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical 
Dissent, 72 Va. L. Rev. 619, 622 (1986) (arguing that juries should be allowed to consider the abused 
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where the woman, and not the expert, is in the best position to describe 
her experiences and environment and how they relate to the 
reasonableness of her use of force. Defendants invoking Stand Your 
Ground defenses are not required to jump the expert testimony hurdle 
that can complicate matters for BWS defendants.  
The most extreme view of BWS appears in Louisiana, where the law 
essentially treats the Syndrome as an insanity defense that might excuse 
the use of deadly force but not justify it.79 Critics of Louisiana’s approach 
argue that BWS is only meant to show the reasonableness of a defendant’s 
actions.80 Indeed, there is no language in Walker’s original description of 
the doctrine requiring a woman to suffer from “any claimed psychological 
incapacity.”81 As David Faigman describes, much of the confusion over the 
purpose of the doctrine arises from the name of the doctrine itself: 
Foremost, the choice of the label “syndrome” suggests a 
medical/biological genesis for the condition, rather than a social or 
behavioral basis. Undoubtedly, advocates believe that likening the 
phenomenon to a medical condition or malady enhances its 
credibility. . . . What began as an attempt to educate the law on the 
realities and necessities of domestic violence has evolved into an 
excuse-based defense founded on the helplessness of the woman 
defendant. Moreover, the medical linkage makes the action 
“understandable” rather than “reasonable,” and thus fails to explain 
why a battered woman kills with justification; instead, the syndrome 
defense merely makes triers of fact sympathetic to the woman’s plight. 
This might explain why syndrome testimony has been mainly effective 
in reducing the severity of the offenses for which these defendants are 
convicted, instead of winning outright acquittals.82 
Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish the constructed syndrome from 
research on domestic violence generally. 
Psychologists developed BWS as a proxy to get evidence in front of a 
jury when it would otherwise be excluded for failing to meet the traditional 
self-defense requirements.83 Research on domestic violence explores the 
factors crucial to understanding the realities of battered women’s lives, 
including anxiety, depression, fear of retaliation, death rate statistics, 
lack of support networks, and economic dependence.84 All of these 
factors are relevant to battered women’s self-defense claims and should 
 
woman’s personal history of abuse in assessing her claim of self-defense). 
 79. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:14; see also State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660 (La. 1985) 
(refusing to admit expert testimony to show a defendant suffered from BWS absent a plea of either 
“not guilty” or “not guilty by the reason of insanity”). 
 80. Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:14. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. §§ 13:14–15. 
 84. Id. § 13:8. 
6. Keegan_14 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2013 1:21 PM 
272 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:259 
 
be admissible as evidence that supports the narrative. The generalized 
aspects of BWS cannot adequately address these issues because it focuses 
on psychological standards that do not necessarily apply to all battered 
women. Further, a woman need not suffer from a psychological 
syndrome or defect to experience these socio-psychological effects. 
In practice, BWS doctrine reinforces the woman as subordinate and 
suggests that an abused woman eventually loses control over her own 
free will and is driven to kill by an inescapable state of helplessness. 
However, “learned helplessness, as a psychological construct, is 
fundamentally at odds with a situation in which a woman has exercised 
the degree of control reflected in the act of self-defense.”85 Self-defense is 
an inherently affirmative act, and the psychology behind BWS fails to 
take into account the will required by a person to kill another in defense 
of oneself. If battered women always faced helplessness to the point of 
paralysis, realistically they would not be able to use any degree of force 
against their abusers. Moreover, reliance on formal psychological 
evidence “turns a blind eye to the woman’s history of abuse, to the social 
and economic pressures preventing her from leaving, and to her 
engrossing fear.”86 Indeed, expert testimony and psychological 
evaluations provides little relevant information when a woman’s reason 
for staying in the relationship is not because of a psychological defect, 
but rather concerns about economic dependence or her children.87 
The common law of self-defense provides a basis for applying the 
True Man rationale in cases of battered women, allowing a woman to 
stand her ground in her own house regardless of whether the aggressor is 
an intruder or an abusive significant other.88 Instead, courts have 
distinguished between traditional castle doctrine cases where the 
aggressor is an intruder, and the castle doctrine as applied to battered 
women with a significant other as the aggressor.89 Even benign 
distinctions between the two scenarios show signs of paternalism. For 
example, in Weiand v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
there is no duty to retreat inside the home before a defendant may use 
deadly force against a cohabitant in self-defense if it is necessary to 
prevent death or serious injury.90 In Weiand, the court cited two policy 
rationales for its decision: (1) “imposing a duty to retreat from the home 
may adversely impact victims of domestic violence,” and (2) “[a] jury 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Faigman, supra note 78, at 643. 
 87. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, § 13:8; see also Schneider, supra note 1, at 627 (discussing 
practical reasons why battered women fail to leave their abusive relationships). 
 88. Suk, supra note 5, at 255. 
 89. Id. (citing State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1997)). 
 90. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999). 
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instruction on the duty to retreat may reinforce common myths about 
domestic violence.”91 
Despite these important policy goals, critics of the decision argue 
that the court relied not on the empowering common law tradition but 
instead replaced this narrative with a woman unable to retreat because of 
her subordinate power position.92 In doing so, the court “replaced the 
true man acting within his rights with the subordinated woman unable to 
retreat” and “brought to bear a feminist critique to conceptualize 
violence in the home as subordination rather than intrusion.”93 Although 
the Florida Supreme Court created a rule in hopes of benefitting battered 
women, the rationale continues to place women in positions of inferiority. 
Ultimately, the stereotypes embedded in BWS doctrine 
disadvantage women with valid self-defense claims. Courts remain 
uncertain about how to utilize evidence of abuse, and the focus on 
psychological infirmary distracts from the inquiry into the reasonableness 
of a defendant’s conduct in light of her circumstances. This inquiry should 
not only allow a woman to describe her experience of helplessness, but 
should also rise to empowerment and her need to stand her ground and 
protect herself, her family, and her home from an attacker. 
Some scholars argue that the rise of Stand Your Ground laws is 
actually positive for women because the statutes integrate BWS into the 
True Man doctrine.94 In particular, the new Florida law permits 
individuals “to treat a cohabitant as an intruder if a [domestic violence] 
protection order commands him to stay away from the home” and 
therefore “embeds [domestic violence] within the home invasion 
paradigm.”95 Although this addition to the castle doctrine is an 
improvement, the statute still requires women to obtain a protective 
order before they are able to protect themselves in their own home.96 The 
prerequisite of a protective order is not always feasible or obtainable, but 
it is necessary under the Florida law for women to treat their abusers the 
same as intruders. 
Unfortunately, law enforcement often provides insufficient 
protection to abused women.97 Sometimes police do not respond to the 
domestic dispute call at all, or the call does not result in an arrest of the 
 
 91. Id. at 1052–54. 
 92. Suk, supra note 5, at 257–58. 
 93. Id. at 258. 
 94. Id. at 264 (describing a new narrative in self-defense doctrine of the “true woman”). 
 95. Id. at 240. 
 96. Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2012). The Florida House has proposed a bill to repeal section 776.013, 
but at the time of publication, the legislature had not yet clarified what rules would instead apply to 
the use of deadly force in the home against a co-resident without a protective injunction. See 
H.B. 4003, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014). 
 97. Schneider, supra note 1, at 626. 
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abuser.98 Reliance on law enforcement to receive legal protections could 
prove to be a deterring obstacle for some women who face the constant 
threat of angering their abusers and suffering retaliatory attacks. The 
failure of police to adequately protect battered women from their 
abusers demonstrates both the impracticality of Florida’s requirement of 
a protective order and the need for abused women to sometimes take the 
law into her own hands.99 
Moreover, Professor Suk concedes that the Florida law limits the 
right to stand one’s ground in domestic violence situations to only when a 
victim is actually being physically abused.100 In other words, women must 
be in the throes of a violent attack before they are permitted to use force 
under the statute.101 Thus, even under the new and broadly construed 
self-defense law in Florida, a battered woman is not permitted to use 
force to protect herself in her own home against an aggressor when the 
aggressor does not fit into the typical intruder paradigm. 
Until battered women can effectively prove the reasonableness of 
their use of deadly force without a near-showing of insanity or the need 
to jump through procedural hoops, self-defense law will continue to be 
embedded with gender stereotypes. Reforming self-defense doctrines to 
be more conducive to gender-neutral claims would allow defendants to 
prove their claims on the basis of reasonableness and remove the need 
for extreme ideologies about masculinity or femininity to make a 
successful self-defense claim. The challenge for reformers, however, will 
be changing biases and preconceived views of the jurors determining the 
outcome of these cases. The psychology behind juror decision-making is 
often so subconscious as to potentially prevent effective legal reform of 
these two gendered self-defense theories. 
III.  Juror Decisionmaking and Social Psychology 
Social psychology plays an important role in evaluating how jurors 
make decisions. Juries, comprised of a diverse collection of the 
community, with varying degrees of education and exposure to legal 
subject matter, must interpret the multitude of facts put in front of them 
 
 98. Id. (citing Police Found., Domestic Violence and the Police 10–18 (1977)) (“85 percent of 
domestic violence cases, the police had been summoned at least once within the two-year period 
before the homicide occurred.”). 
 99. Id. (citing Police Found., Domestic Violence and the Police 10–18 (1977)) (“[T]he law 
enforcement system fails to protect women from abuse. The police often fail to respond to domestic 
disturbance calls. When they do respond, arrest is unlikely; police policy and training manuals stress 
mediation of domestic disputes rather than arrest. One study reports that in 85 percent of domestic 
violence cases, the police had been summoned at least once within the two-year period before the 
homicide occurred. The dead person was usually the woman.”). 
 100. Suk, supra note 5, at 268. 
 101. Id. 
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and decide what information ultimately supports a finding of guilty or 
not guilty. Psychologists Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington suggest that 
in order to make sense of the overwhelming amount of information 
presented, a juror uses “story structures to organize and interpret 
evidence.”102 Dr. Hastie describes this “story model” of decisionmaking 
as being “constructed from information explicitly presented at trial and 
knowledge possessed by the juror. Two kinds of knowledge are critical: 
(a) expectations about what makes a complete story and (b) knowledge 
about events similar in content to those that are the topic of dispute.”103 
This information tells the juror when relevant pieces of the story are 
missing, and when inferences should be made.104 Story organization is 
crucial for jurors because it can not only determine their choice in 
verdict, but also affect their confidence in their vote.105 
A. The Use of Narratives in Jury Trials 
The success of self-defense claims often hangs on whether the jury 
believes a defendant’s account of what happened. As a result, defendants 
tailor the facts of their case to track the legal definition of self-defense as 
closely as possible.106 A defendant’s success in a self-defense claim “will 
depend on both credibility and fit—that is, the rest of us must believe the 
defendant’s recounting is true to both reality and the legal definition of 
self-defense before we, too, designate it self-defense and withhold 
punishment.”107 To appear more believable to a jury, the defendant’s 
narrative “may entail some stretching of the definition to fit the facts, as 
well as facts to definition.”108 Therefore, a jury’s interpretation of the 
defendant’s story can make the difference between a guilty verdict and 
an acquittal. 
The challenge is that even when a defendant has a logically 
constructed story, some jurors simply do not consider it believable or 
reliable.109 Research on the story model shows that “jurors decide cases 
by fitting the evidence presented by the parties into one or more ‘verdict 
stories,’ and then selecting the story that appears most plausible and 
 
 102. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory 
Structure on Judgment, 14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning, Memory & Cognition 521, 521 (1988). 
 103. Id. at 522. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 530. 
 106. Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 261, 264 (2008). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 102, at 530 (“Any advantage in confidence in a not guilty 
verdict that might arise from having the complete defense story may have been offset by its level of 
plausibility, even though knowing the complete story was sufficient to move verdict decisions 
substantially in the not guilty direction.”). 
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coherent to them.”110 Moreover, jurors have “preconceptions and 
attitudes that lead them to entertain particular stories about what may 
have happened” and what verdict they should choose.111 Ultimately, the 
defense must anticipate these expectations, because jurors, 
spontaneously and without prompting, construct their own story 
structure in order to mentally summarize the evidence.112 
During trial, the story structure aids jurors in recalling events and 
constructing a mental picture of the alleged crime:113 
[T]he situational elaborations on which such judgments must be based 
imply the particular proposition so strongly that subjects believe they 
have seen the statement as evidence . . . . Moreover, subjects make 
false recognition judgments almost as fast as they make judgments 
about sentences that they have seen, and they make them 
systematically.114 
These judgments, based on the information’s position in the story’s 
structure, have resounding effects on how much weight a juror gives an 
individual piece of evidence.115 However, the coherence of one story is 
not the only factor to consider in predicting jurors’ decisions, as 
perceptions of the importance of certain evidence depend on the strength 
of one story compared with the alternative narrative.116 
From the opening statement onward, jurors begin constructing the 
evidence into the story that makes the most sense to them. Each attorney 
has a brief window of time to frame the most convincing story, because 
all else being equal, the “probability of obtaining a verdict consistent 
with a story increases when the story is ‘primed’ in the opening 
statement.”117 Defense counsel must simultaneously hook the jury with a 
believable and relatable story while not over-generalizing the individual 
defendant’s personal narrative. This task is exceedingly difficult given the 
additional responsibility of proving that the defendant’s actions were 
objectively reasonable in light of the specific circumstances. 
 
 110. Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 
1455, 1472 (2010). 
 111. Id. (citing Lynda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments: An 
Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 402, 418 (1997)). 
 112. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 102, at 527. 
 113. Id. (“Furthermore, this chronologically ordered causal explanation also serves as a retrieval 
system when subjects are confronted with a memory task.”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (“[S]ubjects’ ratings of the importance of evidence items to their decision can be predicted 
from the items’ story membership and from the position of the item in the story’s causal structure.”). 
 116. Id. at 530. 
 117. Reid Hastie, The Role of “Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 227, 232 
(1999) (noting the role of stories in criminal cases as a point of comparison). 
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B. Jurors and the “Reasonable Person” 
In determining whether defendants are guilty or not, juries are often 
asked to evaluate what a “reasonable person” would have done in the 
same circumstances. The reasonable person is an elusive concept because 
it is meant to be an objective test, but necessarily must consider the 
particular context of a defendant’s situation. On the one hand, if the jury 
envisions the reasonable person as exactly the same as the defendant in 
terms of background, experiences, and perceptions, then the reasonable 
person would naturally act similarly to the defendant under the same 
circumstances.118 Conversely, “a purely objective standard is unduly harsh 
because it ignores the characteristics which inevitably and justifiably 
shape the defender’s perspective, thus holding him (or her) to a standard 
he simply cannot meet.”119 One of the greatest challenges in assessing 
self-defense claims is “striking the balance between the defender’s 
subjective perceptions and those of the hypothetical reasonable 
person.”120 
The elusiveness of the reasonable person standard is controversial 
because of its acceptance of cultural preferences as to who embodies the 
reasonable person and how a reasonable person should behave in a given 
situation.121 The reasonable person standard calls into question “hotly 
contested normative disputes over racial anxiety, gender roles, physical 
violence, and other divisive issues, by shifting attention away from 
explicitly political valuations by the state and towards factual judgments 
during jury deliberations or in the judge’s chambers.”122 By leaving the 
decision of who constitutes a “reasonable” person up to a random jury 
pool, the state avoids the blame for choosing between competing norms. 
This transfer of decisionmaking power from the state to the jury box 
comes at a high cost because it grants “fact-finders the freedom to 
privately succumb to the kind of bias that would, if made public, offend 
our liberal commitments not only to shared forms of justification, but 
also to equality, the universal value of human life, and public reason.”123 
While this solution may temporarily dodge political confrontations, 
localized fact-finding by juries opens the door to individual prejudices 
and inconsistency.124 
In the criminal context, this decentralization of normative 
judgments is even more concerning. Under a reasonable person analysis, 
 
 118. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 513 (1978). 
 119. Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1430, 1434 (1990). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Braman, supra note 110, at 1457. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1459. 
 124. Id. at 1457. 
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the issue of who should be punished for homicide (a normative 
judgment) is transformed into a factual question for the jury to decide. 
Accordingly, it is important to consider the relationship between factual 
issues and a juror’s beliefs, which is also referred to as “cultural 
cognition.”125 Psychologists define cultural cognition as “a collection of 
social and psychological mechanisms that cause individuals to conform 
their factual beliefs to their core values and cultural commitments.”126 
People often align factual ideas with their core values in a “strikingly 
consistent” way.127 Studies explain that this occurs “both because 
individuals process information in ways that minimize the dissonance 
between their factual beliefs and their values, and because they are more 
likely to seek out and be exposed to information from those with whom 
they feel they share important values.”128 Despite an individual’s attempts 
to be objective in evaluating evidence, such thought processes are nearly 
involuntary.129 
This understanding of cultural cognition is directly related to Dr. 
Hastie’s story model and his description of how a juror’s expectations 
factor in to how he or she evaluates evidence. Donald Braman explains: 
[J]urors are less likely to even recall evidence that is inconsistent with 
their preferred verdict story, removing culturally unacceptable 
evidence from consideration. And of course, to the extent that jurors in 
a culturally diverse society are likely to enter the jury room with 
diverse and even antagonistic cultural prototypes, they will sometimes 
disagree over verdicts because they won’t agree on what the evidence 
means—or even what the evidence is.130 
Such studies emphasize how a juror’s personal views on normative 
values affect her ability to recall and interpret evidence. When jurors 
disagree on the meaning of the evidence, cultural cognition leads people 
with different values to competing assessments of the defendant’s 
culpability.131 
 
 125. Id. at 1458. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Braman, supra note 110, at 1458. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 1474–75 (“Culturally diverse individuals honestly believe they are putting their own 
partisan commitments aside and basing their judgments on their perception of the facts of the 
matter—but those perceptions vary along culturally predictable lines. People with different outlooks 
may arrive at different assessments of culpability, then, but they do so through earnest attempts to be 
objective.”). 
 130. Braman, supra note 110, at 1472–73. 
 131. Id. at 1473. 
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IV.  Prospects for Legal Reform in a Legal System That Codifies 
Gender Stereotypes 
Any hope for effective legal reform must take into account the 
jury’s approach to processing and deciding self-defense claims. Through 
the story structure, juries compare moralities of the two actors 
involved.132 Heroes and villains are created through the mere act of 
juxtaposing an unaware self-defender with a malicious assailant.133 
However, this construct exposes the clear masculine bias that pervades 
self-defense claims. From the Wild West to the home, “countering unjust 
violence with just violence evokes romanticized images of the [man], 
defending himself (and perhaps also his honor) against the perils of the 
lawless frontier.”134 The view of the strong and righteous man is 
fundamentally at odds with the picture painted by BWS narratives. 
Unsurprisingly, fearful and helpless female defendants do not 
conjure images of honor and righteousness in the minds of jurors. 
Professor Janine Kim describes: 
[T]he violent ideal of self-defense does not so readily suit the conduct 
of women, who are generally expected to cry and fail in deadly 
confrontation. Accordingly, this gendered narrative implies that 
defensive violence under the paradigm is not so much heated and 
impulsive (i.e., emotional, like women) as it is rational and even 
judicious.135 
One scholar accuses self-defense law of maintaining a set of boys’ 
rules, or “rules that might make sense in the context of men fighting 
other men, but which have no place in the context of male-on-female 
aggression or, therefore, the case of female-on-male self-protection.”136 
Indeed, reformers face challenges in persuading courts to allow self-
defense jury instructions when the context of the homicide is non-
confrontational, as are many homicides in BWS cases.137 
Additionally, the gender bias in BWS increases the likelihood that 
the jury will merely excuse the woman’s conduct, but find it unjustified 
under the law.138 When a defense is treated as an excuse rather than a 
justification, the jury views the defendant’s act as wrong and only 
tolerable because of her mental or emotional state.139 Conversely, 
justified conduct is encouraged under the law, and the jury approves of 
 
 132. Kim, supra note 106, at 266. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 266–67. 
 135. Id. at 267 (citation omitted). 
 136. Joshua Dressler, Feminist (Or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some Critical 
Reflections, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1475, 1480 (2010). 
 137. Id. at 1488. 
 138. Schneider, supra note 1, at 638. 
 139. Id. at 631. 
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the defendant’s act because of the surrounding circumstances.140 The jury 
first looks to see if the circumstances of the act justify self-defense, and if 
not, the jury then assesses the defendant’s mental and emotional state to 
see if this particular actor should be excused.141 Historically, excuse 
defenses have had a detrimental effect on women because even acquittal 
in homicide cases still results in involuntary commitment to psychiatric 
institutions.142 The prevalent view that battered women acting in self-
defense is an insanity defense (excuse) rather than a traditional self-
defense claim (justification) is a significant disadvantage for female 
defendants trying to persuade the jury.143 
The factual issues presented in True Man and BWS cases, as well as 
the type of inferences needed to resolve the issues, are practically 
indistinguishable.144 Braman conducted a study based on two fictional 
defendants modeled after the real cases of Bernard Goetz and Judy 
Norman. Goetz shot and wounded three young African-Americans on 
the subway after one of them confronted Goetz and said “give me five 
dollars.”145 Norman shot and killed her husband in his sleep after years of 
abuse and failed attempts to obtain police protection.146 Professor 
Braman’s study found that a juror’s likelihood of convicting each 
defendant related to their specific gender, racial, political, and ideological 
affiliations.147 This study explicitly assessed the effect of cultural cognition 
on evaluating stand your ground versus BWS cases, and the results 
demonstrate that jurors’ views on culpability significantly diverge along 
cultural lines.148 
 
 140. Id. at 630–31. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 638. 
 143. See Dressler, supra note 136, at 1488 (“Ironically, the practical effect of BWS evidence is to 
pathologize the battered woman. Indeed, a juror simulation study has reported that ‘the presence of 
expert evidence providing a diagnosis of [BWS], compared to a no expert control, [causes] the jurors 
to view the defendant as more distorted in her thinking, and less capable of making responsible 
choices, and less culpable for her actions.’ . . . [U]se of BWS testimony potentially brings courts back, 
full circle, to the early battered women cases, in which women sought to defend themselves on grounds 
of temporary insanity or diminished capacity.”). 
 144. Braman, supra note 110, at 1462–63 (noting similar issues included the danger posed by the 
aggressor, the defendant’s insight informed by his or her personal experiences, and the feasibility of 
alternatives). 
 145. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986). 
 146. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989). 
 147. Braman, supra note 110, at 1465–66 (“Blacks were more likely to convict George than they 
were to convict Julie, while whites were more likely to convict Julie than George. Similar patterns 
emerged for women and men, Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, egalitarians and 
hierarchs, and communitarians and individualists. In each case, the former were more likely than the 
latter to see George as more deserving of punishment than Julie.”). 
 148. Id. at 1468 (“[I]ndividuals will . . . [interpret legal standards] through interlocking social and 
cognitive mechanisms that cause them to rely on a culturally contingent situation sense; an implicit 
knowledge of how the material and social world works.”). 
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Both BWS and the True Man doctrine are theories of self-defense 
that address similar issues of imminence and necessity, but each theory 
tells a completely different story. The process of proving a true man self-
defense claim is also strikingly dissimilar to a BWS claim, as true men 
can testify upfront without expert testimony, without state-mandated 
psychological evaluations, and without pleading an insanity defense. 
With this evidentiary burden placed on BWS defenses, the law adopted a 
model for women’s defense strategies that was essentially based on 
psychological defects. Even if the outcomes are the same under either 
theory, the fact that the models are so different creates problems and 
independent obstacles. 
Furthermore, these distinct narratives rely on the most classic 
gender stereotypes. As such, self-defense law has solidified these 
stereotypes into the substantive law. The stereotypical origins of the true 
man have resounding effects on modern self-defense law. By codifying 
what a man should do when faced with an assailant, the law makes 
normative judgments on who is and is not justified in standing their 
ground. The title of the doctrine itself excludes a majority of the 
population from using the defense effectively because women do not 
historically fit into the framework. 
One possible solution is increased individualization in the jury’s 
evaluation of facts. Elizabeth Schneider, an expert in gender, law, and 
domestic violence, argues that allowing the jury to fully consider the 
defendant’s circumstances and perspective is essential for battered women 
to have comparable treatment in presenting self-defense claims.149 
Individualization is necessary in order to equalize the burden battered 
women face in asserting their claims and to acknowledge the different 
circumstances in which homicides committed by men and women 
occur.150 Schneider asserts that “[w]ithout individualization, the trier of 
fact may be unable either to overcome his stereotypical attitude toward 
the circumstances surrounding the woman’s act or to understand the 
inapplicability of traditional legal rules.”151 Increasing the individualized 
analysis for self-defense claims would certainly improve a woman’s 
ability to express her own perceptions and experience of abuse. 
Further, individualization could work effectively in conjunction with 
the objective reasonable person analysis under a standard of the 
“reasonable person in a long-term violent relationship,” which would 
necessarily take into account the defendant’s experiences with violence 
and whether her actions were reasonable in light of those experiences. 
 
 149. Schneider, supra note 1, at 640. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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Striking a balance between the reasonable person analysis and 
individualization would permit defendants to adequately present their 
claims without having to completely restructure how juries assess 
criminal defenses. 
In the end, the jury is the decisionmaker and jurors must be invited 
to exercise their good judgment. Jurors cannot do this unless they 
understand or have an opportunity to understand why a defendant’s 
conduct is justified. Because juries apply common sense and their own 
experiences, which might include gender stereotypes, to legal decision-
making, the law may be stuck with the current doctrines because of the 
strongly held and easily understood narratives. At a minimum, legal 
reforms should aim to remove these two defenses from their current 
extremes. Within these narratives, there are extremes of both theories 
that are not reasonable, and a middle ground in both that are completely 
reasonable. Juries need individualization of defendants’ claims to 
differentiate between the two. The reality is that reasonable people do 
what they have to do under the circumstances, and this is where the 
middle ground between battered women and true men lies. Individuals 
should have the freedom to effectively use either doctrine based on a 
showing of reasonableness, and not a showing of either John Wayne 
courage or borderline insanity. The solution is to allow a system in which 
the jury is permitted to truly understand the woman’s narrative within 
the domestic violence context so that judge her behavior the same way it 
would judge a man standing his ground. 
Conclusion 
The recent expansion of the True Man doctrine in many states 
revived discussions of the self-defense law generally. Comparing the new 
Stand Your Ground laws with BWS, it becomes apparent that the law 
solidifies gender stereotypes by assessing when an individual is justified 
in using deadly force against an aggressor. True men are empowered to 
use deadly force even in public without a duty to retreat, while battered 
women must provide expert testimony on her psychological condition to 
prove the reasonableness of her use of deadly force in light of her 
extreme helplessness. At their extremes, both of these doctrines are 
detrimental to the criminal law, and potentially encourage dangerous 
policy and undesirable public conduct.152 Legal reforms are needed to 
moderate these extremes and to create a more gender-neutral process to 
proving self-defense claims no matter the theory. While the psychology 
 
 152. The recent, tragic killing of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed, African-American teenager, reflects this 
concern, as well as the potential for racial stereotypes to affect an individual’s perception of imminent danger 
in public places. See generally Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1. 
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of juror decision-making and the roots of the classic narratives likely 
limit prospects for reform, change is necessary to modernize and equalize 
self-defense law. Ideally, a new legal framework of individualization for 
proving self-defense claims can find the middle ground between the 
empowerment doctrine of the true man and the helplessness ideology 
behind Battered Women’s Syndrome, and will allow the jury to do its job 
by listening to each defendant’s narrative regardless of whether it falls 
under the traditional paradigm. 
